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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the Byzantine-robust stochastic optimization problem defined over decentralized static and time-varying
networks, where the agents collaboratively minimize the summation of expectations of stochastic local cost functions, but some of
the agents are unreliable due to data corruptions, equipment failures or cyber-attacks. The unreliable agents, which are called as
Byzantine agents thereafter, can send faulty values to their neighbors and bias the optimization process. Our key idea to handle
the Byzantine attacks is to formulate a total variation (TV) norm-penalized approximation of the Byzantine-free problem, where
the penalty term forces the local models of regular agents to be close, but also allows the existence of outliers from the Byzantine
agents. A stochastic subgradient method is applied to solve the penalized problem. We prove that the proposed method reaches
a neighborhood of the Byzantine-free optimal solution, and the size of neighborhood is determined by the number of Byzantine
agents and the network topology. Numerical experiments corroborate the theoretical analysis, as well as demonstrate the robustness
of the proposed method to Byzantine attacks and its superior performance comparing to existing methods.
Keywords: Decentralized stochastic optimization, Byzantine attacks, robustness, static networks, time-varying networks
1. Introduction
In recent years, decentralized stochastic optimization has become a popular research topic in the signal processing
and machine learning communities. With the rapidly increasing number of distributed devices and volume of gener-
ated data, traditional signal processing and machine learning approaches, which rely on a central controller to collect
the data samples or coordinate the optimization process, suffer from privacy and scalability issues [1]. In decentralized
stochastic optimization, every device (called as agent thereafter) learns its own model using its local data samples,
and periodically exchanges its model with neighboring agents so as to achieve consensus. This scheme is favorable
in privacy preservation since the data samples are kept local, and does not rely on any central controller that could be
a system bottleneck. Existing decentralized stochastic optimization methods include decentralized parallel stochastic
gradient descent (DPSGD) [2], stochastic subgradient projection [3], dual averaging [4], mirror descent [5], etc. Asyn-
chronous algorithms are developed in [6, 7] to reduce the idle time, and variance reduction techniques are proposed
in [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] to improve the convergence rate. Decentralized stochastic optimization methods are shown to be
superior to their centralized counterparts on training large-scale neural networks when the communication links are
subject to high latency and limited bandwidth [13].
However, the lack of centralized coordination in decentralized stochastic optimization also raises concerns on
robustness. Some of the agents might be malfunctioning or even malicious. Due to data corruptions, equipment
failures or cyber-attacks, they can send faulty values to their neighbors and bias the optimization process. We consider
a general Byzantine attack model [14], in which the Byzantine agents are omniscient and can arbitrarily modify the
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values sent to other agents. Such an attack model imposes no restrictions on the adversaries and is worst-case. The
purpose of this paper is to develop a Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method.
Most of the existing decentralized stochastic optimization methods are vulnerable to Byzantine attacks. Take
DPSGD as an example. At every iteration, every agent mixes the models received from its neighbors, followed by a
stochastic gradient step on the cost function constructed from one local data sample (or a batch of them), to update its
local model [2]. When the Byzantine agents send well-designed faulty values instead of the true models, they are able
to lead the regular agents to end up with incorrect results.
Byzantine-robust decentralized deterministic optimization methods have been developed in [15, 16], where at
every iteration every regular agent uses all of its local data samples, instead of one or a batch. The work of [15]
proposes ByRDiE, in which every regular agent utilizes coordinate-wise trimmed mean to screen outliers in the
received models, and then applies coordinate gradient descent to update its local model. The one-coordinate-at-a-
time update of ByRDiE is inefficient for high-dimensional problems [16]. To address this issue, the work of [16]
proposes BRIDGE, which allows every regular agent to update all the coordinates of its local model at every iteration.
Although these two algorithms are originally developed for decentralized deterministic optimization, they can also
be adapted to the decentralized stochastic setting according to our numerical experiments. However, to the best of
our knowledge, most of the existing works do not explicitly consider the Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic
optimization problem; see for reference the recent survey paper [17].
There are some works that consider the Byzantine-robust centralized stochastic optimization problem, where a
central controller aggregates the information from the agents and coordinates the optimization process. The main
idea of these works is to modify the stochastic gradient method with robust aggregation rules. To be specific, at
every iteration, the central controller sends the current model to all the agents, the regular agents send back their
local stochastic gradients, while the Byzantine agents may send back faulty values. When the local data samples are
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the local stochastic gradients are also i.i.d. and the central controller
can obtain a reliable approximation to the average of the local stochastic gradients through aggregating all the received
values with trimmed mean, geometric median, or other robust aggregation rules [18, 19]. However, this idea is not
directly applicable to decentralized stochastic optimization. Since there is no central controller to maintain a common
model, the regular agents have to evaluate their local stochastic gradients at different points. Therefore, even though
the local data samples are i.i.d. the local stochastic gradients are not necessarily so, and thus the robust aggregation
rules have no theoretical guarantee in this case.
In addition to Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization over static networks, we are also interested
in the case that the underlying network topologies are time-varying, which finds applications in mobile computation
systems and robotic swarms. Various decentralized stochastic optimization algorithms over time-varying networks
have been developed, such as those in [20, 21]. Some of the recent works further consider that the time-varying
networks are directed such that the designed mixing matrices are column stochastic [22, 23, 24] or row stochastic
[25]. However, none of these algorithms take into account the existence of Byzantine agents.
This paper develops a Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method over static and time-varying
networks, where the networks are fully decentralized and contain unknown numbers of Byzantine agents, the local
data samples at the regular agents are not necessarily i.i.d. and only one data sample (or a batch of them) is available
for every regular agent at every iteration. The key idea is to formulate a total variation (TV) norm-penalized approx-
imation of the Byzantine-free problem, where the penalty term forces the local models of regular agents to be close,
but also allows the existence of outliers from the Byzantine agents. A stochastic subgradient method is applied to
solve the penalized problem (Section 2). Although the TV norm-penalized approximation has been investigated in
Byzantine-robust decentralized deterministic [26], decentralized dynamic [27] and centralized stochastic [28] opti-
mization problems, its application in Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization is novel. We prove that
the proposed method reaches a neighborhood of the Byzantine-free optimal solution under mild assumptions, and
the size of neighborhood is determined by the number of Byzantine agents and the network topology (Section 3).
Numerical experiments corroborate the theoretical analysis and demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method
to Byzantine attacks (Section 4).
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2. Problem Statement and Algorithm Development
In this section, we describe the formulation of Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization problem,
and develop the algorithm for both static and time-varying networks.
2.1. Static Network Case
Consider a static and undirected network G = (V,E) with a set of n agentsV = {1, · · · , n} and a set of undirected
edges E. If e = (i, j) ∈ E, then agents i and j are neighbors and can communicate with each other at a low cost. Since
the network is undirected, for notational convenience, we let every e = (i, j) satisfy i < j. However, not all the agents
are regular. An unknown number of Byzantine agents are supposed to be omniscient and can send faulty values to
their neighbors during the optimization process. Denote R and B as the sets of regular agents and Byzantine agents,
respectively. We haveV = R∪B. For agent i, denote the set of its regular neighbors as Ri and the set of its Byzantine
neighbors as Bi. Thus, Ni := Ri ∪ Bi is the set of all neighbors of agent i. Denote ER ⊆ E as the set of reliable edges
not attached to any Byzantine agent. The decentralized stochastic optimization problem defined over the network is
x˜∗ = arg min
x˜∈Rp
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(x˜, ξi)] + f0(x˜)
)
, (1)
where x˜ ∈ Rp is an optimization variable (also called as model), F(x˜, ξi) is a smooth cost function determined by
a random variable ξi following a distribution Di and represents an empirical loss related to a randomly chosen data
sample in regular agent i, and f0(x˜) is a smooth regularization term. Here the random variables {ξi, i ∈ R} are not
necessarily i.i.d. that is different to the i.i.d. assumption in [15, 16]. Our goal is to find the optimal solution x˜∗ through
collaboration of the regular agents. The main challenges are three-fold: (i) the network lacks of a central coordinator
and is fully decentralized, (ii) only one randomly chosen data sample (or a batch of them) can be used by every regular
agent at every iteration, and, (iii) more importantly, the Byzantine agents can send faulty values to their neighbors so
as to bias the optimization process, but their identities are unknown.
To develop a reasonable algorithm, it is necessary to assume that the network of regular agents is bidirectionally
connected [27]. Otherwise, if a regular agent is surrounded by Byzantine neighbors, it is unable to communicate and
collaborate with any regular agents. Therefore, the best model it can learn is solely based on its local data samples,
and may be far away from the true model in the non-i.i.d. setting.
Assumption 1. (Network Connectivity over Static Graph) The network consisting of all regular agents i ∈ R, denoted
as (R,ER), is bidirectionally connected.
For future usage, we define A ∈ R|R|×|ER | as the node-edge incidence matrix of (R,ER). To be specific, for an edge
e = (i, j) ∈ ER with i < j, the (i, e)-th entry of A is 1 while the ( j, e)-th entry of A is −1.
We begin from assuming that the Byzantine agents are absent. Rewrite (1) to a consensus-constrained form, which
is common in decentralized optimization. Denote xi ∈ Rp as the local copy of the model x˜ at regular agent i and stack
all local copies in a longer vector x := [xi] ∈ R|R|p. When the regular agents are connected as stated by Assumption 1,
(1) is equivalent to
min
x:=[xi]
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(xi, ξi)] + f0(xi)
)
, (2)
s.t. xi = x j, ∀i ∈ R, ∀ j ∈ Ri,
in the sense that [x˜∗] ∈ R|R|p that stacks |R| vectors of x˜∗, the optimal solution to (1), is the optimal solution to (2).
Then, motivated by [26, 27, 28], we propose to solve a TV norm-penalized approximation of (2), as
x∗ = arg min
x:=[xi]
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(xi, ξi)] +
λ
2
∑
j∈Ri
‖xi − x j‖1 + f0(xi)
)
, (3)
where λ ≥ 0 is a penalty parameter. For every pair of regular neighbors (i, j), xi and x j are forced to be close through
introducing the TV norm penalty
∑
i∈R
∑
j∈Ri ‖xi − x j‖1. The larger λ is, the closer xi and x j are forced to be. On the
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other hand, the TV norm penalty also allows some pairs of xi and x j to be different, which is important when the
Byzantine agents are present as we will discuss later.
Since calculating the full subgradient of the cost function in (3) is time-consuming or even impossible, we solve
(3) with the stochastic subgradient method. At time k, every regular agent i updates its local model xk+1i as
xk+1i = x
k
i − αk
(
∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)
, (4)
where ξki corresponds to the random data sample chosen by agent i at time k, sign(·) is the element-wise sign function,
and αk > 0 is a step size. Given β ∈ R, sign(β) equals to 1 when β > 0, −1 when β < 0, and an arbitrary value within
[−1, 1] when β = 0. Observe that (4) is fully decentralized. To update xk+1i , a regular agent i needs to evaluate its own
local stochastic gradient ∇F(xki , ξki ) and gradient ∇ f0(xki ), as well as combine the models {xkj , j ∈ Ri} received from its
regular neighbors { j, j ∈ Ri}.
Now we consider how (4) performs when the Byzantine agents are present. A Byzantine agent j will not send its
true model to its neighbors at time k. Instead, it sends an arbitrary vector zkj ∈ Rp. In this case, for a regular agent i,
(4) becomes
xk+1i = x
k
i − αk
(
∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)
. (5)
The resulting Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method is outlined in Algorithm 1. In (5),
observe that the elements of sign(xki − zkj) are in the range of [−1, 1], such that the influence of the faulty vector
zkj is limited, although z
k
j can be arbitrary. We will theoretically justify the robustness of the proposed algorithm to
Byzantine attacks in the subsequent section.
Note that the TV norm penalty introduced here is based on the `1 norm. Other norms such as `2 and `∞ are
also applicable, as recommended in [28] for Byzantine-robust centralized stochastic optimization. We leave their
development and analysis to our future work.
Algorithm 1 Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization over static graph
Input: x0i ∈ Rp for i ∈ R, λ > 0, and {αk, k = 0, 1, · · · }.
1: for k = 0, 1, · · · , every regular agent i ∈ R do
2: Broadcast its current model xki to all the neighbors.
3: Receive xkj from regular neighbors j ∈ Ri and zkj from Byzantine neighbors j ∈ Bi.
4: Update local iterate xk+1i according to (5).
5: end for
2.2. Time-Varying Network Case
We further consider the more challenging scenario that the network has time-varying communication edges. At
time k, the underlying undirected communication graph is denoted as Gk = (V,Ek). As in the static case, we denote R
and B as the sets of regular agents and Byzantine agents, respectively, such thatV = R∪B. For agent i, denote Rki as
the set of its instantaneous regular neighbors, Bki the set of its instantaneous Byzantine neighbors, andNki := Rki ∪Bki
the set of all instantaneous neighbors. Denote EkR ⊆ Ek as the set of reliable edges not attached to any Byzantine agent.
With slight abuse of notations, let Ri = ∪∞k=0Rki and Bi = ∪∞k=0Bki collect all regular and Byzantine neighbors of agent
i for all times. The goal is still to solve the decentralized stochastic optimization problem defined in (1).
To guarantee sufficiently frequent information exchange among all regular agents, we require the average network
consisting of all regular agents to be bidirectionally connected. Define a¯e as the frequency of a reliable edge e = (i, j)
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appearing, where i, j ∈ R and i < j, given by
a¯e = lim
K→∞
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
g
(
e ∈ EkR
)
.
Here g
(
e ∈ EkR
)
is the indicator function whose value is 1 if e ∈ EkR, and 0 otherwise. Then, denote E¯R = {e : a¯e > 0},
and call (R, E¯R) as the average network consisting of all regular agents. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (Network Connectivity over Time-Varying Graph) The average network consisting of all regular
agents i ∈ R, denoted as (R, E¯R), is bidirectionally connected.
Assumption 2 is much weaker than Assumption 1 in which there exists a path between any two regular agents at
all times. In contrast, Assumption 2 allows the path to be temporarily disconnected, while ensuring the regular agents
to exchange information in a sufficiently frequent manner.
For future usage, we define A¯ ∈ R|R|×|E¯R | as the weighted node-edge incidence matrix of (R, E¯R). To be specific,
for an edge e = (i, j) ∈ E¯R with i < j, the (i, e)-th entry of A¯ is a¯e while the ( j, e)-th entry of A¯ is −a¯e.
Remark 1. Our time-varying network model is able to describe several common scenarios.
(i) Randomly activated edges. At every time k, every reliable edge e is connected with probability pe ∈ (0, 1]. In this
scenario, a¯e = pe.
(ii) Periodical network. From time 0 to T − 1, every reliable edge e appears te times. These T network topologies
reappear at the following times, with a period of T . In this scenario, a¯e = teT .
(iii) Quasi-periodical network. For any time span with length T , every reliable edge e appears at least te time. In this
scenario, a¯e ≥ teT .
Similar to the equivalent transformation from (1) to (2), if the regular agents are connected as stated by Assumption
2, (1) is equivalent to
min
x:=[xi]
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(xi, ξi)] + f0(xi)
)
, (6)
s.t. xi = x j, ∀i ∈ R, ∀ j ∈ Rki , k = 0, 1, · · · .
The TV norm-penalized approximation of (6) is given by
x∗ = arg min
x:=[xi]
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(xi, ξi)] +
λ
2
lim
K→∞
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
∑
j∈Rki
‖xi − x j‖1 + f0(xi)
)
. (7)
Note that the cost function in (7) contains an expectation termE[F(xi, ξi)] and a long-term average term limK→∞ 1K+1∑K
k=0
∑
j∈Rki ‖xi − x j‖1, such that the stochastic subgradient method is not directly applicable. To address this issue, we
treat Rki as the realization of Ri(ζi), the stochastic set of regular neighbors of agent i with ζi being a random variable,
at time k. Therefore, (7) can be rewritten as
x∗ = arg min
x:=[xi]
∑
i∈R
(
E[F(xi, ξi)] +
λ
2
E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
‖xi − x j‖1] + f0(xi)
)
. (8)
Akin to the static case, (8) can be solved by the stochastic subgradient method. At time k + 1, every regular agent i
updates its local model as
xk+1i = x
k
i − αk
(
∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)
. (9)
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A Byzantine agent j will send an arbitrary vector zkj ∈ Rp instead of the true model xkj to its neighbors at time k.
Therefore, in the presence of Byzantine agents, (9) becomes
xk+1i = x
k
i − αk
(
∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)
. (10)
The resulting Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method over the time-varying network is
outlined in in Algorithm 2. With particular note, our proposed method has a consistent form for both static and
time-varying networks. No specific design of any mixing matrix is needed to adapt to the time-variance.
Algorithm 2 Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization over time-varying graph
Input: x0i ∈ Rp for i ∈ R, λ > 0 and {αk, k = 0, 1, · · · }.
1: for k = 0, 1, · · · , every regular agent i ∈ R do
2: Broadcast its current model xki to all the neighbors.
3: Receive xkj from regular neighbors j ∈ Rki and zkj from Byzantine neighbors j ∈ Bki .
4: Update local iterate xk+1i according to (10).
5: end for
3. Performance Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the proposed Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization
method in terms of convergence and robustness. We make the following assumptions, which are common in ana-
lyzing decentralized stochastic optimization methods.
Assumption 3. (Strong Convexity) The local cost functions E[F(x˜, ξi)] of the regular agents i ∈ R and the regular-
ization term f0(x˜) are strongly convex with constants ui and u0, respectively.
Assumption 4. (Lipschitz Continuous Gradients) The local cost functions E[F(x˜, ξi)] of the regular agents i ∈ R
and the regularization term f0(x˜) are differentiable and have Lipschitz continuous gradients with constants Li and L0,
respectively.
Assumption 5. (Bounded Variance) Every regular worker i ∈ R samples data with random variables ξki ∼ Di at
every time k. The variance of ∇F(x˜, ξki ) is upper bounded by δ2i , i.e., E[‖∇F(x˜, ξki ) − E[∇F(x˜, ξki )]‖2] ≤ δ2i ,∀i ∈ R.
The analysis in this paper shares similarities with that in [28]. However, [28] considers Byzantine-robust central-
ized stochastic optimization, while this paper considers the decentralized case. Due to the underlying decentralized
static and time-varying networks, our proofs are significantly different from those in [28]. Our theoretical results also
explicitly show the influence of the topologies on the performance. We leave the detailed proofs to the appendix.
3.1. Performance Analysis over Static Network
The first theorem shows that the TV norm-penalized problem (3) is equivalent to the consensus-constrained one
(2) (and hence (1) too), when the penalty parameter λ is sufficiently large. This theorem is analogous to Theorem 1 in
[28], but our proof is based on a system of linear equations involving the decentralized network structure and different
from the proof of Theorem 1 in [28].
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold true. If λ ≥ λ0 :=
√|R|
σ˜min(A)
maxi∈R‖∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)]+∇ f0(x˜∗)‖∞ where
σ˜min(A) is the minimum nonzero singular value of the node-edge incidence matrix A of (R,ER), then for the optimal
solution x∗ of (3) and the optimal solution x˜∗ of (1), we have x∗ = [x˜∗].
No matter how large λ is, with a proper step size the proposed stochastic gradient method can converge to the
optimal solution of (3) when the Byzantine agents are absent. However, the Byzantine agents bring disturbance to the
optimization process, and their influence is illustrated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, 4, 5 hold true. Set the step size of the proposed method given by (5) as
αk = min{α, αk+1 }, where α = min{mini∈R 16(ui+Li) , 16(u0+L0) }, and α > 1η with η = mini∈R {
2uiLi
ui+Li
+
2u0L0
u0+L0
− } > 0 and  > 0.
Then, there exists a smallest integer k0 satisfying α ≥ αk0+1 , such that
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα)k‖x0 − x∗‖2 + 1
η
(α∆0 + ∆2), ∀k < k0, (11)
and
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆1
k + 1
+ α∆2, ∀k ≥ k0. (12)
Here we define constants
∆0 =
∑
i∈R
(
48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i
)
, ∆1 = max
{
α2∆0
ηα − 1 , (k0 + 1)E‖x
k0 − x∗‖2 + α
2
∆0
k0 + 1
}
, ∆2 =
∑
i∈R
λ2|Bi|2 p

.
Theorem 2 asserts that the proposed Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method can reach a
neighborhood of the optimal solution x∗ of (3). The convergence rate is sublinear and matches the rates of Byzantine-
free decentralized stochastic optimization methods [2, 3, 4, 5]. The size of neighborhood is proportional to p (the
dimension of model), λ2 (squared penalty parameter), and
∑
i∈R |Bi|2 that is determined by the number of Byzantine
agents and the network topology. Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we derive the main Theorem as follows.
Theorem 3. Under the same conditions of Theorem 2, if choosing λ ≥ λ0, then for a sufficiently large k ≥ k0, we have
E‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ ∆1
k + 1
+ α∆2. (13)
If choosing 0 < λ < λ0 and supposing that the difference between the optimizers of (3) and (1) is bounded by
‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ ∆3, then for a sufficiently large k ≥ k0, we have
E‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ 2∆1
k + 1
+ 2α∆2 + 2∆3. (14)
When λ is large enough, according to Theorem 1, (3) is equivalent to (1). Therefore, the gap between xk and x∗
directly translates to the gap between xk and [x˜∗] as in (13). However, if λ is too large, the gap will also be large
because ∆2 is proportional to λ2. When λ is too small, (3) cannot guarantee to have a consensual solution. In this
case, the gap between [x˜∗] and x∗ is unclear, but we assume that it is bounded by ∆3. Therefore, we are also able to
characterize the gap between xk and [x˜∗] as in (14).
3.2. Performance Analysis over Time-Varying Network
Analogous to Theorem 1, when the network is time-varying, we can also show that as long as λ is large enough,
the penalized problem (8) has the same optimal solution as the Byzantine-free problem (1).
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 and 3 hold true. If λ ≥ λ0 :=
√|R|
σ˜min(A¯)
maxi∈R‖∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗)‖∞ where
σ˜min(A¯) is the minimum nonzero singular value of the weighted node-edge incidence matrix A¯ of (R, E¯R), then for the
optimal solution x∗ of (8) and the optimal solution x˜∗ of (1), we have x∗ = [x˜∗].
Different to the static case where the critical parameter λ0 depends on the node-edge incidence matrix A of (R,ER),
here λ0 depends on the weighted node-edge incidence matrix A¯ of (R, E¯R). When the time-varying network degener-
ates to the static one, we have A¯ = A such that Theorem 4 coincides with Theorem 1.
The following theorem establishes the convergence property of the proposed stochastic subgradient method under
Byzantine attacks.
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Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, 4, 5 hold true. Set the step size of the proposed method given by (10) as
αk = min{α, αk+1 }, where α = min{mini∈R 16(ui+Li) , 16(u0+L0) }, and α > 1η with η = mini∈R {
2uiLi
ui+Li
+
2u0L0
u0+L0
− } > 0 and  > 0.
Then, there exists a smallest integer k0 satisfying α ≥ αk0+1 , such that
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα)k‖x0 − x∗‖2 + 1
η
(α∆4 + ∆6), ∀k < k0, (15)
and
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆5
k + 1
+ α∆6, ∀k ≥ k0. (16)
Here we define constants
∆4 =
∑
i∈R
(
48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i
)
, ∆5 = max
{
α2∆4
ηα − 1 , (k0 + 1)E‖x
k0 − x∗‖2 + α
2
∆4
k0 + 1
}
,
and
∆6 =
∑
i∈R
(2λ2|Bi|2 p

+
8λ2|Ri|2 p

)
.
With Theorem 5, we conclude that the proposed Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization method
can also reach a neighborhood of the optimal solution x∗ of (8) when the underlying network is time-varying. Com-
bining Theorems 4 and 5, we get the main theorem as follows.
Theorem 6. Under the same conditions of Theorem 5, if choosing λ ≥ λ0, then for a sufficiently large k ≥ k0, we have
E‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ ∆5
k + 1
+ α∆6. (17)
If choosing 0 < λ < λ0 and supposing that the difference between the optimizers of (8) and (1) is bounded by
‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ ∆7, then for a sufficiently large k ≥ k0, we have
E‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2 ≤ 2∆5
k + 1
+ 2α∆6 + 2∆7. (18)
4. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct several numerical experiments to demonstrate the robustness of our proposed method
to Byzantine attacks over static and time-varying networks.
4.1. Numerical Experiments over Static Network
Consider a static Erdos-Renyi network consisting of n = 30 agents, where every edge e is activated with probability
pe = 0.7. Randomly choose b agents to be Byzantine, but guarantee that the network of regular agents is connected.
The data set is MNIST, which contains 10 handwritten digits from 0 to 9, with 60,000 training images and 10,000
testing images. In the i.i.d. case, we randomly and evenly distribute the training images to all the agents. In the
non-i.i.d. case, we let every three agents evenly split the training images of one digit. We use the softmax regression
with regularization term f0(x˜) = 0.012 ‖x˜‖22 to learn the model. At the testing stage, we randomly choose one regular
agent and use its local model to calculate the classification accuracy. Also, we calculate the variance of regular agents’
local models to quantify the level of consensus.
The benchmark methods are DPSGD [2], as well as the stochastic versions of ByRDiE [15] and BRIDGE [16]
(denoted by ByRDiE-S and BRIDGE-S, respectively). In DPSGD, the mixing matrix is constructed following the
equal neighbor weights rule [29]. In ByRDiE-S, the coordinates of the model are updated sequentially, and the
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number of inner-loop iterations to update every coordinate is set to be 1, as suggested by [15]. For fair comparison,
in ByRDiE-S one iteration refers to that all the coordinates have been updated once. Step sizes of the benchmark
methods are hand-tuned to the best.
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Figure 1. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models without Byzantine attacks.
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Figure 2. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models under same-value attacks.
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Figure 3. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models under sign-flipping attacks.
Without Byzantine Attacks. When the number of Byzantine agents is b = 0, all the methods perform well in terms
of both classification accuracy and level of consensus, as depicted in Figure 1. In our proposed method, we set the
penalty parameter as λ = 0.005 and the step size as αk = 0.3√
k+1
. Because of the sensitivity of the O( 1k ) step size to its
initial value, we use the O( 1√
k
) step size in the numerical experiments.
Same-value Attacks. Let the number of Byzantine agents be b = 3. Every Byzantine agent j ∈ B sends zkj = c1 to
its neighbors. Here 1 ∈ Rp is an all-one vector and c is a constant which we set as 100. In our proposed method, the
9
/ 00 (2020) 1–21 10
penalty parameter is λ = 0.01 and the step size is αk = 0.28√
k+1
. As shown in Figure 2, DPSGD fails and our proposed
method is the best among all the three Byzantine-robust methods in terms of classification accuracy. Its variance is
higher than that of ByRDiE-S, but small enough such that all the regular agents have high classification accuracies.
Sign-flipping Attacks. Let the number of Byzantine agents be b = 3. Every Byzantine agent j ∈ B first calculates
its true model, and then multiplies it with a negative constant γ and sends to its neighbors. Here we set γ = −4. In
our proposed method, the penalty parameter is λ = 0.0022 and the step size is αk = 0.5√
k+1
. As shown in Figure 3,
the results are consistent with those under the same-value attacks, but the performance gain of our proposed method
in terms of classification accuracy is more obvious. Note that we choose a relatively small λ such that the level of
consensus is slightly worse than those of ByRDiE-S and BRIDGE-S.
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Figure 4. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models with different λ under same-value attacks.
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Figure 5. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models with non-i.i.d. data.
Impact of Penalty Parameter λ. To investigate the impact of penalty parameter λ, we choose several different values
for λ in the setting of same-value attacks with b = 3 Byzantine agents. The step sizes are hand-tuned to the best. As
shown in Figure 4, larger λ ensures better consensus, which corroborates the theoretical results in Section 3. When
λ = 0, the level of consensus is the worst, since the agents do not communicate and learn with their own local data
samples independently. However, larger λ leads to larger gap relative to the Byzantine-free optimal solution, and
hence lower classification accuracy. This observation also matches the theoretical results in Section 3.
Non-i.i.d. Data. Let the number of Byzantine agents be b = 6. All the Byzantine agents copy the values of one
randomly chosen regular agent, and send to their neighbors. Recall that every three agents evenly split the training
images of one digit and here we deliberately let the Byzantine agents share the training images of digits 8 and 9.
Therefore, information from digits 8 and 9 is totally lost and the best classification accuracy we can reach is no more
than 0.8. Note that under these particularly designed attacks, DPSGD is able to reach a satisfactory classification
accuracy. In our proposed method, the penalty parameter is λ = 0.02 and the step size is αk = 0.4√
k+1
. As shown in
Figure 5, our proposed method almost coincides with DPSGD with respect to classification accuracy. ByRDiE-S and
BRIDGE-S do not perform well under such attacks, because nine agents (including six Byzantine agents and three
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regular agents) essentially use the training images of one digit, such that the models trained from this particular digit
dominate. Therefore, the majority voting rules of ByRDiE-S and BRIDGE-S emphasize more on this particular digit,
while ignore other digits relatively.
4.2. Numerical Experiments over Time-Varying Network
Consider a static Erdos-Renyi networks consisting of n = 30 agents, in which b = 3 agents are Byzantine but
the network of regular agents is connected. We generate two time-varying networks upon it. At every time k, every
edge e is randomly activated with probabilities pe = 0.01 and pe = 0.005, respectively. We consider the same-value
attacks, where every Byzantine agent j ∈ B sends zkj = c1 to its neighbors, with 1 ∈ Rp being an all-one vector and
c = 100. The algorithm parameters are: (i) λ = 0.01 and αk = 0.28√
k+1
for the static network, (ii) λ = 0.2 and αk = 0.5√
k+1
for the time-varying network with pe = 0.01, and, (iii) λ = 0.4 and αk = 0.5√k+1 for the time-varying network with
pe = 0.005. Note that smaller pe means worse connectivity, which leads to smaller σ˜min(A¯) as we have empirically
observed from the experiments. Therefore, according to Theorem 4, the critical value of λ that guarantees consensus,
given by λ0 :=
√|R|
σ˜min(A¯)
maxi∈R‖∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗)‖∞, should be larger for smaller pe.
As shown in Figure 6, our proposed method shows remarkable robustness to the Byzantine attacks even when
the network is time-varying. The classification accuracies are almost the same over the static and the time-varying
networks. The level of consensus degrades when pe decreases. This makes sense because in a less connected network,
information diffusion is slower such that reaching consensus becomes more difficult.
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Figure 6. Classification accuracy and variance of regular agents’ local models under same-value attacks over static and time-varying networks.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we deal with the Byzantine-robust decentralized stochastic optimization problem over static and
time-varying networks. We introduce the TV norm penalty to handle Byzantine attacks and propose a stochastic
subgradient method to solve the penalized problem. Theoretical analysis and numerical experiments demonstrate the
robustness of our proposed method to Byzantine attacks, no matter the network topology is static or time-varying. In
our future work, we will investigate the application of variance reduction techniques, which have been shown effective
in Byzantine-robust centralized stochastic optimization [31], to the decentralized case. We will also consider TV norm
penalties based on `2 and `∞ norms [28].
Acknowledgement. Qing Ling is supported in part by NSF China Grant 61973324, and Fundamental Research Funds
for the Central Universities. A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in IEEE International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, Barcelona, Spain, May 4-8, 2020 [32].
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The optimal solution x∗ := [x∗i ] of (3) satisfies the optimality condition
∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + λ
∑
j∈Ri,i< j
si j − λ
∑
j∈Ri,i> j
si j + ∇ f0(x∗i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ R, (A.1)
where si j = sign(x∗i − x∗j). Note that x∗ is unique due to the strong convexity given by Assumption 3. We will prove
that [x˜∗] satisfies (A.1), such that
∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + λ
∑
j∈Ri,i< j
si j − λ
∑
j∈Ri,i> j
si j + ∇ f0(x˜∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ R, (A.2)
where each element of si j is within [−1, 1].
For simplicity, define vi := ∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗). Since (A.2) can be decomposed element-wise, from now on
we assume the variable dimension p = 1 such that both si j and vi are scalars. Then, (A.2) can be rewritten as a system
of linear equations
λAs + v = 0, (A.3)
where s = [si j] collects all the scalars si j in order and v = [vi] collects all the scalars vi in order. Now the problem is
equivalent to finding a vector s whose elements are within [−1, 1], namely, ‖s‖∞ ≤ 1, to satisfy (A.3).
We first show that (A.3) has at least one solution. To see so, observe that the rank of A is |R| − 1 and the null space
of the columns is spanned by the all-one vector 1|R| ∈ R|R|, because (R,ER) is bidirectionally connected according to
Assumption 1. Meanwhile, according to the optimality condition of (1),
∑
i∈R vi =
∑
i∈R (∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗)) = 0.
Therefore, the columns of λA and those of [λA, v] share the same null space and have the same rank. Consequently,
we can find at least one solution to (A.3).
We next find one solution to (A.3) that satisfies ‖s‖∞ ≤ 1. According to the above derivation, we also know that we
can find at least one solution to s′ to As′ + v = 0. Among all the solutions to As′ + v = 0, we consider the least-squares
solution given by s′ = −A†v, where † denotes the pseudo inverse. This solution is bounded by
‖s′‖2 = ‖A†v‖2 ≤ σmax(A†)‖v‖2 ≤ 1
σ˜min(A)
‖v‖2,
where σmax(·) and σ˜min(·) denotes the largest and the smallest nonzero singular values, respectively. Since ‖s′‖∞ ≤
‖s′‖2 and ‖v‖2 ≤
√|R|‖v‖∞, we further have
‖s′‖∞ ≤
√|R|
σ˜min(A)
‖v‖∞ =
√|R|
σ˜min(A)
maxi∈R|vi|.
Then, we construct s = 1
λ
s′, which is a solution to (A.3) because As′ + v = 0. In addition, we have
‖s‖∞ = 1
λ
‖s′‖∞ ≤
√|R|
λσ˜min(A)
maxi∈R|vi|,
which is less than 1 as long as λ ≥
√|R|
σ˜min(A)
maxi∈R|vi|.
Now we consider the variable dimension p ≥ 1. For all the dimensions we construct vectors s in this way such
that ‖s‖∞ ≤ 1 as long as λ ≥ λ0 :=
√|R|
σ˜min(A)
maxi∈R‖∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗)‖∞. This completes the proof.
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Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Step 1. From the update (5) at every regular agent i, we have:
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (B.1)
=E‖xki − x∗i − αk
(∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)‖2
=E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2
− 2αkE〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 − 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj), xki − x∗i 〉.
Below, we handle the terms at the right-hand side of (B.1) one by one.
For the second term at the right-hand side of (B.1), we have
E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (B.2)
=E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki ) + ∇F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2
≤2E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 2E‖F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2
≤4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 4λ2E‖
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj)‖2 + 2E‖F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2
≤4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ,
where the last inequality holds true because that each element of the p-dimensional vector sign(xki − zkj) is within
[−1, 1], and that the variance is bounded by E‖F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2 ≤ δ2i stated in Assumption 5. Plugging the
optimality condition 0 ∈ ∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + λ
∑
j∈Ri sign(x
∗
i − x∗j) +∇ f0(x∗i ) of (3) into the first term at the right-hand side
of (B.2) and replacing ξi by ξki , we have
4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (B.3)
=4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ) − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )] − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 12λ2E‖
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) −
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 24λ2E‖
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj)‖2 + 24λ2‖
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 48λ2|Ri|2 p,
where the first inequality is due to (a + b + c)2 ≤ 3a2 + 3b2 + 3c2. Combining (B.2) and (B.3), we have
E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (B.4)
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i .
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For the third term at the right-hand side of (B.1), noticing that xki is independent with ξ
k
i such that
E[〈∇F(xki , ξki ), xki − x∗i 〉] = E[〈∇E[F(xki , ξki )], xki − x∗i 〉], (B.5)
we have
− 2E〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 (B.6)
= − 2E〈∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉.
Plugging the optimality condition 0 ∈ ∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + λ
∑
j∈Ri sign(x
∗
i − x∗j) + ∇ f0(x∗i ) of (3) into (B.6) and replacing
ξi by ξki , we have
− 2E〈∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 (B.7)
= − 2E〈∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )], xki − x∗i 〉 − 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉
− 2E〈∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i ), xki − x∗i 〉.
Since we assume that the functions E[F(xi, ξki )] and f0(xi) are strongly convex and have Lipschitz continuous gradients
(cf. Assumption 3 and 4), by [30] we have
− 2E〈∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )], xki − x∗i 〉 (B.8)
≤ − 2uiLi
ui + Li
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 −
2
ui + Li
E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2,
and
−2E〈∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i ), xki − x∗i 〉 ≤ −
2u0L0
u0 + L0
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 −
2
u0 + L0
E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2. (B.9)
Substituting (B.7), (B.8) and (B.9) into (B.6), we have
− 2E〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 (B.10)
≤ − 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉 − (
2uiLi
ui + Li
+
2u0L0
u0 + L0
) E‖xki − x∗i ‖2
− 2
ui + Li
E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 −
2
u0 + L0
E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2.
For the last term at the right-hand side of (B.1), it holds for any  > 0 that
− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj), xki − x∗i 〉 (B.11)
≤E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
λ2

E‖
∑
j∈Bi
sign(xki − zkj)‖2
≤E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
λ2|Bi|2 p

.
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Substituting (B.4), (B.10) and (B.11) into (B.1) and combining the terms, we have
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (B.12)
≤(1 − αk( 2uiLi
ui + Li
+
2u0L0
u0 + L0
− ))E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2(48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ) + αk λ2|Bi|2 p
− 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉
− 2αk( 1
ui + Li
− 6αk)E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 − 2αk(
1
u0 + L0
− 6αk)E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2.
Due to the step size rule, we have 1ui+Li − 6αk ≥ 0 and 1u0+L0 − 6αk ≥ 0, and hence can drop the last two terms of at the
right-hand side of (B.12). Also noticing the definition of η, we rewrite (B.12) into
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (B.13)
≤(1 − ηαk)E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2(48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ) + αk λ2|Bi|2 p
− 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉.
Step 2. Here we define Ip(x) = λ2
∑
i∈R
∑
j∈Ri ‖xi − x j‖1. Since Ip(x) is convex, we have
〈∂xIp(xk) − ∂xIp(x∗), xk − x∗〉 (B.14)
=
∑
i∈R
〈λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Ri
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉 ≥ 0.
Summing up (B.13) over all regular agents i ∈ R and adding to (B.14), we have
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 (B.15)
≤(1 − ηαk)E‖xk − x∗‖2 + (αk)2 ∑
i∈R
(48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ) + αk
∑
i∈R
λ2|Bi|2 p

=
(
1 − ηαk)E‖xk − x∗‖2 + (αk)2∆0 + αk∆2,
where the constants ∆0 and ∆2 are defined as
∆0 =
∑
i∈R
(
48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i
)
, ∆2 =
∑
i∈R
λ2|Bi|2 p

.
Step 3. According to the step size rule αk = min{α, αk+1 }, there exists a smallest integer k0 satisfying α ≥ αk0+1 such
that αk = α when k < k0 and αk = αk+1 when k ≥ k0. Then for all k < k0, (B.15) becomes
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα)E‖xk − x∗‖2 + (α)2∆0 + α∆2, ∀k < k0. (B.16)
By the definitions of η and α, ηα ∈ (0, 1). Applying telescopic cancellation to (B.16) through time 0 to k < k0 yields
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα)kE‖x0 − x∗‖2 + 1
η
(α∆0 + ∆2), ∀k < k0. (B.17)
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For all k ≥ k0, (B.15) becomes
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα
k + 1
)
E‖xk − x∗‖2 + (α)
2∆0
(k + 1)2
+
α∆2
k + 1
, ∀k ≥ k0. (B.18)
Note that 1 − ηαk+1 ∈ (0, 1) when k ≥ k0. Below, we use induction to prove
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆1
k + 1
+ α∆2. ∀k ≥ k0, (B.19)
where
∆1 = max{ α
2
∆0
ηα − 1 , (k0 + 1)E‖x
k0 − x∗‖2 + α
2
∆0
k0 + 1
}.
When k = k0, by (B.18), we have
E‖xk0+1 − x∗‖2 (B.20)
≤(1 − ηα
k0 + 1
)
E‖xk0 − x∗‖2 + (α)
2∆0
(k0 + 1)2
+
α∆2
k0 + 1
≤E‖xk0 − x∗‖2 + (α)
2∆0
(k0 + 1)2
+
α∆2
k0 + 1
≤ ∆1
k0 + 1
+ α∆2.
Now suppose that (B.19) is true when k = k′ > k0, such that
E‖xk′+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆1
k′ + 1
+ α∆2. (B.21)
When k = k′ + 1, because k′ + 1 > k0 according to (B.18) we have
E‖xk′+2 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 − ηα
k′ + 2
)
E‖xk′+1 − x∗‖2 + (α)
2∆0
(k′ + 2)2
+
α∆2
k′ + 2
. (B.22)
Substituting (B.21) into (B.22), we have:
E‖xk′+2 − x∗‖2 (B.23)
≤(1 − ηα
k′ + 2
) ∆1
k′ + 1
+
(α)2∆0
(k′ + 2)2
+ α∆2 + (1 − ηα) α∆2k′ + 2
(a)≤(1 − ηα
k′ + 2
) ∆1
k′ + 1
+
(α)2∆0
(k′ + 2)2
+ α∆2
(b)≤(1 − ηα
k′ + 2
) ∆1
k′ + 1
+
(ηα − 1)∆1
(k′ + 2)2
+ α∆2
≤(1 − ηα
k′ + 2
) ∆1
k′ + 1
+
(ηα − 1)∆1
(k′ + 1)(k′ + 2)
+ α∆2
≤ ∆1
k′ + 2
+ α∆2.
where (a) uses the fact that α > 1
η
, and (b) follows from ∆1 ≥ α
2∆0
ηα−1 . This completes the induction and the entire proof.
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. When λ ≥ λ0, combining Theorems 1 and 2, we directly reach (13). When 0 < λ < λ0, we have
E[‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2] ≤ 2E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] + 2E[‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2]. (C.1)
Because E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆1k+1 + α∆2 and E[‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2] ≤ ∆3, we reach (14) and complete the proof.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The optimal solution x∗ := [x∗i ] of (8) satisfies the optimality condition
∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + E[λ
∑
j∈Ri(ζi),i< j
si j − λ
∑
j∈Ri(ζi),i> j
si j] + ∇ f0(x∗i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ R, (D.1)
where si j = sign(x∗i − x∗j). Note that x∗ is unique due to the strong convexity given by Assumption 3. Considering the
definition of A¯ = [a¯ie], the weighted node-edge incidence matrix of (R, E¯R), we rewrite (D.1) to
∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + λ
∑
e=(i, j)∈E¯R,i< j
aiesi j − λ
∑
e=(i, j)∈E¯R,i> j
aiesi j + ∇ f0(x∗i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ R, (D.2)
We will prove that [x˜∗] satisfies (D.2), such that
∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + λ
∑
e=(i, j)∈E¯R,i< j
aiesi j − λ
∑
e=(i, j)∈E¯R,i> j
aiesi j + ∇ f0(x˜∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ R, (D.3)
where each element of si j is within [−1, 1].
Define vi := ∇E[F(x˜∗, ξi)] + ∇ f0(x˜∗). Since (D.3) can be decomposed element-wise, we start from assuming the
variable dimension p = 1 such that both si j and vi are scalars, and then extend to the high-dimensional case. By the
definition of A¯, (D.3) can be rewritten as a system of linear equations
λA¯s + v = 0, (D.4)
where s = [si j] collects all the scalars si j in order, v = [vi] collects all the scalars vi in order. Now the problem is
equivalent to finding a vector s whose elements are within [−1, 1], namely, ‖s‖∞ ≤ 1, to satisfy (D.4). The rest of the
proof is the same as that of Theorem 1, only replacing A by A¯.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Step 1. From the update (10) at every regular agent i, we have
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (E.1)
=E‖xki − x∗i − αk
(∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )
)‖2
=E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2
− 2αkE〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 − 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj), xki − x∗i 〉.
Below, we handle the terms at the right-hand side of (E.1) one by one.
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For the second term at the right-hand side of (E.1), we have
E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (E.2)
=E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki ) + F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2
≤4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 4λ2E‖
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj)‖2 + 2E‖F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2
≤4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 4λ2|Bki |2 p + 2δ2i
≤4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ,
where the second equality holds true because that each element of the p-dimensional vector sign(xki − zkj) is within
[−1, 1], and that the variance is bounded by E‖F(xki , ξki ) − ∇E[F(xki , ξki )]‖2 ≤ δ2i stated in Assumption 5.
Plugging the optimality condition 0 ∈ ∇E[F(x∗i , ξi)] + λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi) sign(x
∗
i − x∗j)] + ∇ f0(x∗i ) of (8) into the first
term at the right-hand side of (E.2) and replacing ξi by ξki , we have
4E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (E.3)
=4E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ) − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )] − λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)] − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 12λ2E‖
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)]‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 24λ2E‖
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj)‖2 + 24λ2E‖
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 48λ2|Ri|2 p.
Here the second inequality is due to (a + b + c)2 ≤ 3a2 + 3b2 + 3c2. To obtain the last inequality, we observe that
E‖∑ j∈Rki sign(xki − xkj)‖2 ≤ E‖∑ j∈Ri sign(xki − xkj)‖2 ≤ |Ri|2 p and that E‖∑ j∈Ri(ζi) sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 ≤ ‖∑ j∈Ri sign(x∗i −
x∗j)‖2 ≤ |Ri|2 p. Combining (E.2) and (E.3), we have
E‖∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj) + ∇ f0(xki )‖2 (E.4)
≤12E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 + 12E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2 + 48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i .
For the third term at the right-hand side of (E.1), similar to the proof from (B.5) to (B.10), we reach
− 2E〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 (E.5)
≤ − 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)], xki − x∗i 〉 − 2(
uiLi
ui + Li
+
u0L0
u0 + L0
) E‖xki − x∗i ‖2
− 2
ui + Li
E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 −
2
u0 + L0
E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2.
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Since it holds for any  > 0 that
− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j) − λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)], xki − x∗i 〉 (E.6)
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
2λ2

E‖
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j) − E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)]‖2
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
4λ2

E‖
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 +
4λ2

‖E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)]‖2
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
8λ2|Ri|2 p

.
To obtain the last inequality, we observe that E‖∑ j∈Rki sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 ≤ E‖∑ j∈Ri sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 ≤ |Ri|2 p and that
E‖∑ j∈Ri(ζi) sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 ≤ ‖∑ j∈Ri sign(x∗i − x∗j)‖2 ≤ |Ri|2 p. Note that due to the use of these loose upper bounds,
the second term at the right-hand side of (E.6) is proportional to |Ri|2. As a consequence, the eventually derived size
of convergence neighborhood is also monotonically increasing when |Ri|2 increases. With (E.6), we have
− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)], xki − x∗i 〉 (E.7)
= − 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j) − λ E[
∑
j∈Ri(ζi)
sign(x∗i − x∗j)], xki − x∗i 〉 − 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
8λ2|Ri|2 p

− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉.
Combining (E.5) and (E.7) yields
E〈∇F(xki , ξki ) + λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) + ∇ f0(xki ), xki − x∗i 〉 (E.8)
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
8λ2|Ri|2 p

− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) −
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉 − 2(
uiLi
ui + Li
+
u0L0
u0 + L0
) E‖xki − x∗i ‖2
− 2
ui + Li
E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 −
2
u0 + L0
E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2.
For the last term at the right-hand side of (E.1), it holds for any  > 0 that
− 2E〈λ
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj), xki − x∗i 〉 (E.9)
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
2λ2

E‖
∑
j∈Bki
sign(xki − zkj)‖2
≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
2λ2|Bki |2 p

≤ 
2
E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +
2λ2|Bi|2 p

.
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Substituting (E.4), (E.8) and (E.9) into (E.1), we have:
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (E.10)
≤(1 − αk( 2uiLi
ui + Li
+
2u0L0
u0 + L0
− ))E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2(48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ) + αk(2λ2|Bi|2 p + 8λ2|Ri|2 p )
− 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉
− 2αk( 1
ui + Li
− 6αk)E‖∇E[F(xki , ξki )] − ∇E[F(x∗i , ξki )]‖2 − 2αk(
1
u0 + L0
− 6αk)E‖∇ f0(xki ) − ∇ f0(x∗i )‖2.
Due to the step size rule, we have 1ui+Li − 6αk ≥ 0 and 1u0+L0 − 6αk ≥ 0, and hence we drop the last two terms at the
right-hand side of (E.10). Also noticing the definition of η, we rewrite (E.10) into
E‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 (E.11)
≤(1 − ηαk)E‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (αk)2(48λ2|Ri|2 p + 4λ2|Bi|2 p + 2δ2i ) + αk(2λ2|Bi|2 p + 8λ2|Ri|2 p )
− 2αkE〈λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(xki − xkj) − λ
∑
j∈Rki
sign(x∗i − x∗j), xki − x∗i 〉.
Step 2 and Step 3. With (E.11), the rest of the proof follows that of Theorem 2.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. When λ ≥ λ0, combining Theorems 4 and 5, we directly reach (17). When 0 < λ < λ0, we have
E[‖xk+1 − [x˜∗]‖2] ≤ 2E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] + 2E[‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2]. (F.1)
Because E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ∆6k+1 + α∆5 and E[‖x∗ − [x˜∗]‖2] ≤ ∆7, we reach (18) and complete the proof.
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